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The Problem of Clean Hands 
 
 
Abstract.  The problem of dirty hands concerns the apparently inevitable need for effective 
politicians to do what is ethically wrong.  This essay discusses a related problem in democratic 
elections of politicians being unwilling to commit themselves to precise positions on controversial 
policy issues.  Given certain plausible assumptions, I demonstrate using a simple game theoretic 
model that there is an incentive structure for political candidates that is damaging to the public 
good.  I contrast this problem with the classic prisoner’s dilemma and then go on to discuss some 
possible strategies for overcoming this problem by an improved system of political debates. 
 
 
 It has been 35 years since Michael Walzer published his famous article “The Problem of 
Dirty Hands”, which examines the moral dilemma in real world politics that good politicians must 
learn how not to be good in order to be effectively good.1  One aspect of this old problem is that it 
seems impossible to be a successful major politician without making various unsavory deals and 
alliances, and yet we want our politicians to be ethical – the sort of people who would not make 
such ethically suspect deals and alliances.  Walzer sees this problem as primarily a problem for the 
politician.  Of course, in a democracy, which politician ends up leading the nation is up to the 
voters, who face a different (albeit related) problem.  This is the heretofore unnamed problem of 
clean hands.  Allow me to explain. 
 Let us assume that information alienates voters.  In other words, as a statistical 
generalization, that it is easier to convince voters not to vote for someone than to vote for someone.  
They are easier to turn off than to turn on.  More precisely, let’s assume that a voter’s agreement 
with a candidate on a single issue is much less likely to cause the voter to vote for that candidate 
than a single disagreement is to cause a voter to vote against (i.e., to rule out voting for) that 
candidate.  The prevalence (and apparent effectiveness) of negative campaign advertisements 
certainly suggests that this is true.  So, by taking a clear stance on an issue, a candidate is doing two 
things:  giving those who agree with the stance a reason to vote for her, and giving those who 
disagree a reason to vote against her.  A vague, equivocal or non-committal stance is likely to 
neither incline voters to vote for the candidate nor incline them to vote against.  Or, even better for 
the candidate, they may imaginatively project their own views onto the candidate. 2  At the very 
least, it is the safe strategy.  Because of this, savvy candidates (especially those leading in the polls) 
will often avoid taking clear stances.  This infuriates some political commentators and many other 
intelligent people who are looking for more information on which to base their decisions.  We want 
politicians who are clear, direct and forthcoming about their views, but the candidates are unwilling 
to get their hands dirty (or what will be seen by some voters as dirty) by taking clear stances.  The 
question is whether we can reasonably be upset with these slippery rhetoricians (i.e., savvy 
candidates), and what voters should do about it? 
 The similarity in both problems, dirty hands and clean hands, is that both are concerned with 
the gap between what we want in an elected representative and what is necessary to get elected.3  
We want politicians to be honest and incorruptible, and yet because they are good we also want 
them to do what is necessary to win the election, even if that means lying and making deals with 
corrupt power brokers (for they will do us no good if not elected).  We want politicians to be honest 
and forthcoming about what they would do if they were elected, but we don’t want them to alienate 
so many voters with the details of their plans that they never reach office.4  Again, they do us no 
good if they don’t win.  But the problem is obviously that if all the candidates follow this advice, no 
one clarifies their positions and voters are left with no clear means of determining who they should 
vote for.  By candidates doing what is individually rational for themselves (and those who share 
their real beliefs), they end up creating a situation that is worse for everyone.5   
 The problem here is similar to classic problems of collective action.  If we idealize the 
situation, it can be represented game theoretically.  We can assume that candidates have two distinct 
choices, obfuscate or clarify.  Though a similar analysis applies to n candidates, for convenience we 
can represent just two candidates.  The payoffs for each candidate will be the probability that they 
will win the election.6 
 
                                  Strong 
Weak                        Sally  Ö 
William °                     
 
Obfuscate 
 
Clarify 
 
Obfuscate 
 
                               (3)  52% 
   48%  (2) 
                               (4)  47% 
   53%  (1) 
 
Clarify 
 
                               (1)  59% 
    41%  (4) 
                               (2)  55% 
   45%  (3) 
 
We can assume that there is one candidate that is marginally stronger.  This stronger candidate is 
the more qualified candidate.7  I assume that if we set various prejudices to one side, then voters 
will be more likely to vote for the better qualified candidate if both candidates clarify.8  Of course, 
these probabilities are somewhat arbitrary, but they are useful in giving a better feel for the meaning 
of the ordinal rankings of each candidate’s preferred outcome. 
 Each candidate benefits most if he obfuscates while his opponent clarifies.  If both 
candidates clarify, then Strong Sally has a marked advantage over Weak William because once 
voters have seen their stances clearly, they are more likely to vote for the qualified candidate.   
 This game has some things in common with the classic prisoner’s dilemma (PD), but it is 
certainly not the same thing.  In the first place, the ordinal payoff matrix is different.9   
                                Player   
                                       B  Ö 
Player A °                     
 
Confess 
 
Stay Quiet 
 
Confess 
 
                           (3) 7 years  
  7 years (3) 
                           (4) 10 years  
  0 years (1) 
 
Stay Quiet 
 
                           (1) 0 years  
  10 years (4) 
                           (2) 1 year 
  1 year (2) 
 
In the PD, the equilibrium is at a point that is clearly irrational (from collective perspective, at least) 
in that it is not pareto optimal.  In the problem of clean hands (PCH), the equilibrium is arrived at 
because it is the dominant choice for both players, which is the same reason behind the equilibrium 
in the PD.  But in the PCH it is better for Weak William than the other shared strategy of both 
players clarifying.  In the PCH, all outcomes are on the pareto frontier because it is a zero-sum 
game, not a cooperative game.  The sense in which the equilibrium reached in the PCH is irrational 
comes from the fact that it is bad for society, not for the players.  In the PD, the players end up in a 
situation that is collectively worst (say, 14 total years spent in prison), while in the PCH the end 
result from the candidates individually rational action is a sub-optimal situation for society (who are 
not exactly players in the game), but not the worst case scenario for society, which would be having 
Weak William obfuscate and Strong Sally clarify. 
 Nevertheless, there are enough similarities to think that perhaps a similar kind of solution 
might help.  In order to solve PD kinds of collective action problems, it is often best for someone to 
step in and alter the payoff matrix so as to change the equilibrium.  In social situations this is often 
the government’s job.  Of course, these changes to the payoff matrix are generally not without some 
cost, which leads to inefficient externalities, but nevertheless these are often worthwhile in avoiding 
the fundamental problem caused by the PD.  The PCH seems to cry out for a similar kind of 
solution.  The question is how we can alter the payoffs so that candidates have the incentive to 
clarify and not obfuscate. 
 The best social outcome is the one that gives the strong candidate the best chance of winning 
the election, which would mean allowing the strong candidate to obfuscate while motivating the 
weak candidate to clarify.  However, it seems quite impossible to develop a fair and effective means 
of doing this.  The best we can hope to do is to ensure that both candidates clarify their positions.  
Under our (admittedly idealized) assumptions, this gives strong candidates a fair advantage over 
weak candidates.  But the question is what social or legal pressure can be applied to ensure that this 
clarification occurs.  One cannot simply issue a legal mandate that candidates clearly articulate their 
positions.  This wouldn’t work for any number of reasons.10  To be effective, a strategy needs to 
give candidates a reason to prefer providing more clarity. 
 Campaign speeches and political advertisements are of little help in providing clarity 
because they are entirely controlled messages with nothing promoting candor.  But, in principle, 
political debates have a structure that can promote clarification of candidates’ positions, especially 
if candidates can question each other directly, because each candidate typically benefits from the 
other candidate clarifying his stances (especially on issues where he wishes to avoid clarification).  
So, society might be able to solve the PCH, at least in part, by pressuring candidates into 
participating in public debates that would lead to a clarification of their positions.  Indeed, this 
pressure seems fairly easy to generate because candidates already have a legitimate concern about 
being seen as afraid to debate their opponent.    
 However, in practice, political debates tend to have very little about them that resembles 
‘real’ debating, because the candidates’ own campaign staff have taken control of how these debates 
are run and have opted for less risky formats where candidates can present largely prepared remarks 
that are not significantly more clarifying than their campaign speeches.11  Occasionally, some bit of 
candor or insight will come through, but this is exceptional.  Moreover, the length of candidates’ 
responses at these events is generally much too short to provide much substance.12  One might 
locate the real source of the problem with debates in the lack of critical listening skills among the 
electorate, which seems more moved by the pathos of stories than the logos of policy analysis.13  
Rationally self-interested candidates play to the mass audience.  This is a problem that might be 
rectified by having the news media commentators focus our attention on the substance of what is 
said, but the opposite seems to be much more prevalent.14  Commentary on political debates seems 
to focus much more on style than on substance, again perhaps because there is too little substance in 
the first place to focus on.   
 Perhaps the debates can be fixed or another medium could be found to promote clarification 
by candidates, but this will be difficult.  In the US, candidates have found ways to avoid clarifying 
their controversial positions while appearing willing to do so, such as by our system of pseudo-
debates.  Since one cannot force candidates to speak, a solution would need to provide adequate 
incentive for candidates to clarify.  One approach could work by dramatically increasing public 
campaign funding and making receipt of these funds dependent on participation in some system 
designed to clarify candidates’ views.  Another more bottom-up approach would involve changing 
the practices of the news media in how they cover campaigns, so that more substantial positions 
were demanded from candidates.  The former seems unlikely, though not unthinkable.  The latter 
would be wonderful (for many reasons) and is possible, but it seems even less likely.  The problem 
of clean hands is a formidable foe. 
Eric Barnes 
Hobart and William Smith Colleges 
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2    Similarly, recent studies of on-line daters show that people tend to be more excited by people when they know less 
about them.  Most people seem to fill in the gaps in their knowledge favorably in that context.  A similar 
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issues become much less interesting, but typically this is not the case. 
 
8    There are many well acknowledged problems in democratic elections.  Foremost among these is that voters are often 
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idealize away from these factors and assume that the candidates are roughly on par with respect to prejudices.  The 
problem would be just as serious if there were prejudices in favor of one candidate, as there are for William in the 
chart below where William is no more qualified, just more popular due to prejudice.  We still are best off if we find 
a way to make both candidates clarify. 
 
                                          Strong 
Weak                                Sally  Ö 
William °                     
 
Obfuscate 
 
Clarify 
 
Obfuscate 
 
                                (3)  46% 
   54%  (2) 
                                     (4)  42% 
   58%  (1) 
 
Clarify 
 
                                 (1)  53% 
    47%  (4) 
                                     (2)  49% 
   51%  (3) 
 
Of course, the prejudice could just as well run in Sally’s favor, but this would still not change the underlying 
structure of the problem where obfuscation dominates clarifying to the detriment of good governance. 
 
9  This is the ordinal payoff matrix for a prisoner’s dilemma, with numbers of years in prison associated with a typical 
background story.      
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
10  One reason is that democratic systems are as reluctant to force speech as they are to suppress it.  Perhaps a more 
basic problem is that it wouldn’t be possible to precisely specify the degree clarity required or to measure precisely 
the adequacy of the clarification provided on the issues.  Numerous other problems also exist. 
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debate.  Presidential debates are clearly the most important political debates in the United States, and these usually 
last around 90 minutes.  Even when these debates focus on a particular topic (say, the environment), it is safe to say 
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